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Miller: Party Sophistication

PARTY SOPHISTICATION AND
VALUE PLURALISM IN CONTRACT
Meredith R. Miller*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In a previous article, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and
the New Formalism,1 I documented a trend in United States case law
and scholarship that fashions a “dichotomy between sophisticated and
unsophisticated parties.”2 That article set out to explain the trend as a
theoretical compromise between formalism and realism in the face of
a resurgence of formalism (the “new formalism”).3 For sophisticated
parties, “freedom of contract”4 and literalism have come to trump all
normative concerns.5 For unsophisticated parties, fairness concerns
outweigh the principle of autonomy.6
However, as I noted in the previous article, the “new formalism” may not be formalism at all because it retains normative concerns.7 Indeed, the shift in legal thought may be more appropriately
and simply characterized as embracing pluralism. This piece will
place observations about party sophistication within recent scholarship discussing pluralist conceptions of contract doctrine and suggest
*

Associate Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. I am thankful
to former Dean Lawrence Raful for generous research support and to Nicholas Vitalo for
diligent research assistance. Errors and omissions are mine alone.
1
Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO.
L. REV. 493, 493 (2010).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 495.
4
See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 59 (2004) (defining freedom of contract as
“the idea, fundamental in the orthodox understanding of contract law, that the content of a
contractual obligation is a matter for the parties, not the law”).
5
Miller, supra note 1, at 503.
6
Id. at 508.
7
Id. at 495.
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that the focus on sophistication is a means to order contract law’s
competing values.
The values of contract law are autonomy,8 efficiency,9 fairness and equality,10 certainty, and predictability.11 These values often
implicate a fundamental and difficult choice between individualism
and greater societal norms and expectations; therefore, the values
have the potential to conflict. For example, the principle that the law
should be predictable and rules-driven so that parties can plan their
obligations may find itself in conflict with fairness concerns. For this
reason, contract law permits excuse of an express and unambiguous
condition precedent to avoid forfeiture.12 This abandonment of literalism may bend to fairness concerns, but it does not serve autonomy,
certainty, and predictability. By way of another example, economic
theories assert that a party should breach a contract if doing so would
be efficient.13 Even though a breach is efficient, however, it may not
be fair to the other party and it may not be the moral action.14
8

Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the “Law of Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 441 (1995) (“Contracts should be
enforced because they ‘foster[] individual autonomy, promot[e] fair allocation of social benefits, and minimiz[e] the costs of transacting.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting David
Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1817-18 (1991))). “Autonomy” is a word that is often used without
definition. I use the term “autonomy” to broadly describe the value of individual choice in
private ordering, free from government interference. I use the term “freedom of contract”
interchangeably with “autonomy,” though I recognize that there may be room to argue that
the two concepts overlap but are distinguishable. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 139 (discussing the differences between “autonomy” and “freedom of contract”).
9
DiMatteo, supra note 8, at 376 n.150 (“Efficiency has long been an underlying norm of
many of contracts’ foundational premises.”). “Efficiency” is intended to describe the economic principle of maximizing individual gains, which, in turn, should increase societal
wealth. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (4th ed. 2003); see also
SMITH, supra note 4, at 108-09 (discussing the theory of efficiency in contract law).
10
Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV.
73, 77 (2006) (stating “fairness and equity. . . lies at the core of contract law”).
11
Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded Influences into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 839, 874
(1999) (“Contracts are born of the need for certainty.” (quoting Martin E. Segal, Foreseeability in a Fog: Uncertainty Over Pre-existing Duties Can Undermine Contracts, 82 A.B.A.
J. 86 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
12
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1981).
13
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 537-39 (6th ed. 2009).
14
SMITH, supra note 4, at 130; Brian H. Bix, Contract Rights and Remedies, and the Divergence Between Law and Morality, 21 RATIO JURIS. 194, 198 (2008); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
Objectivity and Subjectivity in Contract Law: A Copernican Response to Professor Shiffrin,
21 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 399, 408 (2008) (noting that efficiency and morality will
never be harmonized); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise,

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/10

2

Miller: Party Sophistication

2013]

PARTY SOPHISTICATION

661

Given the potential for these values to compete, Professor
Roy Kreitner recently observed that “[p]luralism is on the agenda of
contract theory.”15 Indeed, scholars have proffered serious arguments
for a pluralist approach to contract formation,16 interpretation,17 and
remedies.18 Other scholars have recognized contract doctrine as pluralistic.19 Still others, while not necessarily arguing expressly for
pluralism, have rejected the possibility of a single, unifying theory of
contract law in favor of “pragmatism.”20 Further still, recent arguments have been made for a pluralist conception of not only contract
doctrine, but all of private law.21
“Pluralism” is not readily defined. The term here is intended
to refer to “value pluralism.”22 Broadly, in the words of Isaiah Berlin, this is recognition of “the fact that human goals are many, not all
of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another.”23
120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 710-11 (2007).
15
Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 915,
915 (2012).
16
Leon Trakman, Pluralism in Contract Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2010).
17
Kent Greenawalt, A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation: Wills and Contracts, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 533, 534 (2005).
18
C. Scott Pryor, Principled Pluralism and Contract Remedies, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV.
723 (2009).
19
See Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory 8 (Tel Aviv Univ.
Law Faculty Papers,
Working Paper
No. 138, 2012),
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2104987; Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and
Conciliation in the General Theory of Contract, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 4 (2005); Nathan
Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1485, 1498 (2005).
20
See, e.g., LARRY A. DIMATTEO, ROBERT A. PRENTICE, BLAKE D. MORANT & DANIEL D.
BARNHIZER, VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY: RATIONALITY, BARGAINING, AND
INTERPRETATION 4-5 (2007) (“Ultimately, contract theory should reflect the pragmatism of
contract law. Contract law is a reflection of a continuing framework of compromises between competing values, interests, and norms. The authors hope that a richer and more
worthwhile dialogue will be possible once the idea of a unified theory of contract law or the
idea of a contract metaprinciple is rejected.” (citation omitted)); ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE
RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF
CONTRACT LAW 2 (2d ed. 1998) (“Although I will insist that no unitary theory adequately
captures the entire contract-law field, my message is not an ‘anti-theoretical counter-attack,’
but rather a pragmatic synthesis of the conceptual and the concrete.” (quoting Jay M.
Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (1990))). Although I do not tackle it here, it is worth exploring whether, in this context, pluralism and
pragmatism are different concepts and, if so, how they are different.
21
Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law 2 (Tel Aviv Univ. Law
Faculty Papers, Working Paper No. 128, 2011), available at http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/
fp/art128.
22
See Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 329, 333-34 (2007) (describing “value pluralism”).
23
Id. at 334 (quoting Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
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As applied to contract law, pluralist theories “advert to autonomy, efficiency, morality, social norms, policy, experience, and other values
to explain and justify contract doctrines.”24
Pluralism is contrasted with “monist” (or “unification”) theories, those that strive to unify the entire body of contract law based on
one “ ‘super’ value”25 (or “metaprinciple”)26 over all others. The
prevailing unifying theories of contract law are well rehearsed—will
theory, consent theory, promissory principle, the collaborative view,
and economic theories of efficiency.27 This Article will not undertake to rehash these theories. Each of them prioritizes a certain value.28 For example, the promise principle argues that the moral obligation of making a promise forms the central basis of contract law.29
Similarly, more recently, the collaborative view is a communitarian
one that explains the morality of promise in contract law as deriving
from recognition and respect among contracting parties.30 Economic
theories look to efficiency as the unifying principle.31 The will and
consent theories look to autonomy as the guiding principle.32
These unifying theories are admirable attempts at coherence,
but they all fall short by failing to reconcile competing values. In this
connection, pluralism recognizes that, necessarily, these values may
find themselves in conflict and, therefore, no one value is an apt descriptive or normative fit for contract law.

171 (1969)) (internal quotation mark omitted), available at http://www.wiso.unihamburg.de/fileadmin/wiso_vwl/johannes/Ankuendigungen/Berlin_twoconceptsofliberty.pdf.
24
Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 688 n.1 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002). “[P]luralism is a fairly basic intuition, captured by the idea that there is a multiplicity
of justificatory principles applicable to a particular set of institutions or problems.” Kreitner,
supra note 15, at 915.
25
Trakman, supra note 16, at 1064; Kraus, supra note 24 (describing how monist theories
“purport to explain and justify contract law by rendering it coherent under a single explanatory/justificatory principle”).
26
Cf. DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 20.
27
See generally Kreitner, supra note 15 (discussing different theories of contract law).
28
Admittedly, this is an overstatement because many of the theories, in recognizing their
own limitations, admit that some of contract doctrine may not be explained by a certain value. Kreitner, supra note 15, at 916 n.5.
29
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 17
(1981); Shiffrin, supra note 14, at 749-53.
30
Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1420 (2004).
31
See DiMatteo, supra note 8 (illustrating that economic theory is based on the principles
of efficiency).
32
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 319 (1986).
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With reference to my previous writing on the subject,33 Section I of this Article addresses the increasing significance of labeling
a party “sophisticated.” The next section summarizes the argument
that party sophistication preserves fairness norms in the face of a resurgence of formalism. Section III provides a brief overview of Professor Kreitner’s typology of the existing pluralist contracts scholarship. Then the Article presents its central claim: the attention to the
sophistication of contracting parties fits neatly within a theoretical
shift toward pluralism and provides a way to strive for coherence and
yet still order the competing values of contract law. After addressing
some case examples in Section IV, this Article concludes that, once
the status-based label of “sophistication” is applied, the law can prioritize one value (autonomy) over others (fairness). This allows for a
general and comprehensive body of contract law, which would otherwise be impossible given the wide variety of parties and contexts
that contract law serves.
II.

THE INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF PARTY SOPHISTICATION

As I began to document in Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, “[a]n ever growing body of case law
and scholarship has fashioned a rigid dichotomy between sophisticated and unsophisticated parties in a wide array of contract inquiries.”34
Scholars, often from an economic perspective, state that their arguments apply only to “sophisticated parties” in an effort to quell any
arguments about the fairness of their theories to a situation of imbalanced bargaining power.35 Courts mention party sophistication in determining whether the parties intended to form a contract,36 and what
they meant by the terms they used.37 They determine the enforceability of reliance disclaimers,38 exculpatory clauses,39 and liquidated

33

Miller, supra note 1.
Id. at 493-94 (citations omitted). I will set aside for now the argument made in that article that the concept of “sophistication” needs to be thoughtfully defined and deliberately
applied.
35
Id. at 493 n.2.
36
Id. at 516-18 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to contract formation).
37
Id. at 502-04 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to contract interpretation).
38
Miller, supra note 1, at 505-08 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to reliance
disclaimers).
39
Id. at 508-10 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to exculpatory clauses).
34
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damages provisions40 based, at least in part, on party sophistication.
Courts reference sophistication in determining whether a party can
avoid a contract on the grounds of mistake or fraud.41 “While [average] consumers are commonly contrasted with sophisticated parties,
the relevance of party sophistication is not limited to consumer transactions. Its relevance transcends any one area of substantive law—
arising in commercial, business, employment, franchise, insurance,
family and property disputes, among others.”42
I have argued that the trend toward party sophistication is aptly understood as a theoretical compromise between formalism and
realism, the contours of which are provided below.
III.

SOPHISTICATION AND THE NEW FORMALISM

In The Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore eloquently described how literature and the arts have endured “alternating rhythms
of classicism and romanticism.”43 Gilmore contemplated “the possibility of such alternating rhythms in the process of the law.” 44 Contract law’s rhythms appear to alternate between the poles of formalism and realism (or “anti-formalism”).
Roughly, “formalism” is intended to refer to a theory of contract law that, above all else, elevates the content of the parties’ written contract (its form) over any concerns for normative values or so40

Id. at 510-12 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to economic loss rule, limitations on damages, and liquidated damages).
41
Id. at 512-14 (discussing relevance of party sophistication to mistake); id. at 505-08
(discussing relevance of party sophistication to claim of fraud).
42
Miller, supra note 1, at 494 (citing Green v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 5:08cv-00198, 2008 WL 2622917, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. June 30, 2008)) (indicating that plaintiffs
described themselves as “ ‘unsophisticated consumers’ who ‘did not understand the details
of the transaction’ ”); Warner v. Ford Motor Co., No. 06-cv-02443-JLK-MEH, 2008 WL
4452338, at *15 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2008) (noting that the purchasers of cars “were likely
relatively unsophisticated consumers with little bargaining power”); Leonard v. Terminix
Int’l Co., L.P., 854 So. 2d 529, 538 (Ala. 2002) (discussing how the homeowners were “not
sophisticated or wealthy consumers with equal bargaining power”)).
43
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 111 (Ronald K. L. Collins, ed., 2d ed.
1995). Gilmore observed that “the classical aesthetic, once it has been formulated, regularly
breaks down in a protracted romantic agony.” Id. But, “[t]hen, the romantic energy having
spent itself, there is a new classical reformulation—and so the rhythms continue.” Id. at 112;
see also Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443,
1483-84 (2008) (discussing Gilmore’s description of “alternating rhythms of classicism and
romanticism” (quoting GILMORE, supra note 43) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
44
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/10

6

Miller: Party Sophistication

2013]

PARTY SOPHISTICATION

665

cietal notions of fairness.45 It is an a-contextual and rules-driven approach dedicated to literalism.46 With these priorities, formalism is
ideologically justified by freedom of contract.47 It is committed to
the ideal of voluntary, private actors creating their own legally binding obligations, free from judicial interference.48 As a rules-based
approach,49 formalism permits certainty and predictability in the marketplace, but leaves little room for case-by-case inquiries that consider the context of the deal, the behavior of the parties, and their relative bargaining positions.50
By the conventional account, formalism reigned in United
States contract law until the mid-20th century.51 At this time, the realist movement in contract law began a shift away from formalism’s
“context insensitivity.”52 Realism demonstrated concern for the particular circumstances of the parties; standards-based approaches
emerged, with reasonableness and fairness as guiding principles.53
The realist movement met with the criticism that adherence to fairness norms curtailed the certainty and predictability contract law allows in the marketplace.54
In reaction to the concerns about preserving certainty and stability in the law, some scholars have noted generally, and in contract
law more specifically, that the theoretical pendulum appears to be
swinging back in the direction of formalism55 (which has been termed
45

Bridgeman, supra note 43, at 1443.
Id. at 1461.
47
See id. at 1449 (stating that “rules are . . . binding because they are rules,” not because
they are substantively justified).
48
Id. at 1472.
49
Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 043: Formalism and Instrumentalism, LEGAL
THEORY LEXICON (May 22, 2005), http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/05/legaltheory-lexicon-043-formalism-and.html.
50
Id.
51
Mark L. Movsesian, Formalism in American Contract Law: Classical and Contemporary, 12 IUS GENTIUM 115, 116 (2006) (discussing that the realist era of contract began in
mid-1900s).
52
See Bridgeman, supra note 43, at 1448 (explaining how the term “context insensitivity”
may be used to describe “a case where the application of a rule leads to injustice for particular parties in their situation, . . . despite justification for the rule in most cases”).
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1445.
55
See Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of Contract, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1529, 1530 (2002) (reviewing THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley
ed., 1999) (stating that “developments [in contract law] reflect a new formalism”); see also
Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism (Stanford Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Series, Working Paper No. 4, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/zpapers.cfm?abstract_id=200732
46
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“neoformalism”56 or “anti-antiformalism”57). In contract law, the
new formalism is evidenced by the resilience of the bargain principle,
the courts’ reluctance to interfere with the substance of the parties’
contract, and the prominence of literalism.58
However, this renewed tendency towards formalism has not
developed without regard for the concerns addressed during the realist period. At least nominally, through the dichotomy based on party
sophistication, the law has attempted to preserve concern about the
context of a transaction.59

(indicating that a formalistic approach is preferred); Jay M. Feinman, Un-making Law: The
Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2004); David Charny,
The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 842 (1999) (observing a return to
formalism in contracts scholarship).
56
John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 869, 891 (2002) (describing trend of neoformalism in contracts scholarship). Professor
Murray did note that “[i]t seems unnecessary to refer to this school as ‘neoformalism’ notwithstanding differences between their rationale and the underlying philosophy of classical
formalism. The results are essentially identical.” Id. at 892 n.115.
57
Charny, supra note 55.
58
Movsesian, supra note 55.
59
For example, courts have not abandoned the doctrine of unconscionability, with its focus on procedural and substantive fairness. The unconscionability doctrine allows courts to
deny enforcement of a contract (or a term of a contract) when that contract (or a term thereof) is, on balance, procedurally and substantively unfair. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c. (1981); U.C.C. § 2-303 cmt. 1 (2011). This standards-based doctrine survives to preserve the realists’ normative concerns. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 10,
at 74 (stating that unconscionability serves to protect fairness). This is readily evidenced by
the court’s frequent application of unconscionability to temper strict enforcement of adhesion contracts in the consumer context. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration,
Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 800-01 (2004) (indicating courts’ refusal to enforce an adhesion contract if the agreement is unconscionable).
Moreover, courts have not rejected reliance-based theories, and they continue to interpret
contracts contextually by reference to trade usage, course of performance, and course of
dealing. See, e.g., Kiely v. Raytheon Co., 105 F.3d 734, 736 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying the
doctrine of promissory estoppel); Adams v. Johns-Manville Corp., 876 F.2d 702, 704-05
(9th Cir. 1989) (referencing course of dealing); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F.
Supp. 2d 659, 679-80 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (applying doctrine of promissory estoppel); Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 654 F. Supp. 1419, 1429 (D. Del. 1987) (looking to the
course of performance to interpret parties’ agreement); Prenger v. Baumhoer, 939 S.W.2d
23, 24-27 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997) (applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel); SmithScharff Paper Co. v. P.N. Hirsch & Co. Stores, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Mo. App. E.D.
1988) (referencing course of dealing). Practical Products Corp. v. Brightmire, 864 P.2d 330,
333 (Okla. 1992) (discussing how general trade usage supplemented the terms contract);
Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 459 A.2d 329, 332 (Pa. 1983) (looking to
the course of performance to interpret parties’ agreement); Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Lower
& Co., 770 P.2d 692, 696-97 (Wyo. 1989) (referencing trade usage).
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SOPHISTICATION AND VALUE PLURALISM

Much in line with Grant Gilmore’s observation of the possibility of “alternating rhythms in the process of the law,”60 Professor
Roy Kreitner posits that perhaps the “changing fashion in the legal
academy represent[s] a pendulum swing of theory” between monism
and pluralism.61 Indeed, the “new formalism” may be more appropriately and simply characterized as embracing pluralism because, to the
extent it retains normative concerns, it may not be formalism at all.
Writing about rationales of tort law, Professor Christopher
Robinette looks to Isaiah Berlin to derive four basic elements of value pluralism: “First, human values and goals are irreducibly many.
Second, these values and goals have the potential to conflict; they
may be incompatible. Third, these values and goals may be incommensurable. Fourth, these values and goals are objective.”62 Robinette explains that the first element describes the values as “irreducible” because “the multiple goals and values are truly distinct; they do
not just appear that way to those of us not sophisticated enough to
understand the commonalities.”63 Second, the observation that these
values may conflict is recognition that individual liberty and social
justice may not be compatible.64 Third, the values may be “incommensurable” because there is no ready tool to choose among them.65
Though not express in Robinette’s analysis, this could also be taken
to mean that the prioritization of the values is context-driven. Finally, values and goals are described as “objective” because they are essentially fundamental to being human.66
These four elements also resonate as an account of contract
law. Autonomy, efficiency, fairness and equality, certainty, and predictability are values that may conflict. Taken out of context, one
60

GILMORE, supra note 43, at 112.
Kreitner, supra note 15, at 916.
62
Robinette, supra note 22, at 334.
63
Id. at 335.
64
Id. (quoting Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 167
(Oxford Univ. Press 1969)) (“It is a commonplace that neither political equality nor efficient
organization nor social justice is compatible with more than a modicum of individual liberty,
and certainly not unrestricted laissez-faire; that justice and generosity, public and private
loyalties, the demands of genius and the claims of society, can conflict violently with each
other.”).
65
Id. at 336.
66
Id.
61
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could easily mistake Berlin’s observations as a fitting description of
the difficult task for contract law: these values often conflict because
of the precarious balance of freedom and individualism with greater
societal norms and expectations.67 Indeed, no more transparent is the
difficulty of this task than in the public policy cases—the cases, for
example, concerning whether to enforce surrogacy contracts, noncompete clauses, and exculpatory agreements. Even though it is not
always as transparent as in the public policy cases, this tension persists throughout all areas of contract doctrine.
Although it might be tempting to resign to the acknowledgment that the values of contract law are incommensurable, that itself
conflicts with the value contract law places on predictability and certainty. A failure to pursue some coherent explanation of the law
gives up on making it certain and predictable so that parties can order
their private affairs accordingly. This is where party sophistication
comes into play. It is an intuitive tool, though a crude one, to decide
which competing values to prioritize in any given contracting situation.68 It reflects a compromise between the search for the cohesion
of a unifying theory and the recognition that contract law serves fundamental values that often find themselves in conflict.
This section of the Article looks to Professor Kreitner’s typology of the current, pluralist conceptions of contract theory and
then demonstrates how party sophistication is placed neatly within it.
A.

The Variants of Value Pluralism in Contract

Professor Kreitner provides a thoughtful mapping of the current pluralist contract scholarship.69 Kreitner first identifies the “borders of pluralism.”70 One border represents the scholarship that attempts to reconcile central and competing principles. He describes
these works as the outer edge of pluralism because “they seem to imply that theory allows for the type of ordering that will do away with
conflict or competition among the values.”71 Kreitner next identifies
the other border of pluralism, those scholars who are critical of theory
and wonder whether a pragmatic and principled theory of contract is
67
68
69
70
71

Robinette, supra note 22, at 335-36.
Id.
Kreitner, supra note 15, at 917.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 919.
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even possible.72
Between these two positions, Kreitner discerns three variants
of pluralist contract scholarship.73 The first category represents the
work of scholars who argue to prioritize competing values by subdividing the world of contract by party or transaction types. 74 In the
second category, Kreitner summarizes the work of Professor Jeffrey
Lipshaw and describes it as “metaphysical pluralism,” which, loosely, he explains as acknowledging the complexity of incompatible
norms and yet recognizing that this duality is a “central and even routine feature” of contracting.75 The third category looks to Professor
Gregory Klass’s theory about the nature of contract rules as either
“duty-imposing” or “power-conferring.”76
B.

Sophistication’s Fit Within Pluralist Conceptions
that Look to Status and Transaction Type

This Article focuses on the first variant of pluralism—that
which subcategorizes the world of contracts into types. Kreitner collects some of the prominent works in the group, which look to either
the types of parties or types of contracts in an attempt to guide the
doctrine.77
On the subject of party types, Kreitner looks to the work of
Professor Ethan Leib.78 In response to the collaborative view of contract, Leib argues that “pluralism . . . requires more attention within
contract theory.”79 He describes the monism of the collaborative
view as “frustrating precisely because contract’s heterogeneity likely
demands a pluralistic theory.”80 This discussion is a reaction to the
collaborative theory’s application only to contracts between individuals, not those between organizations or an organization and a per-

72

Id.
Id.
74
Kreitner, supra note 15, at 919.
75
Id. at 921; see generally Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Contract Formalism, Scientism, and the
M-Word: A Comment on Professor Movsesian’s Under-Theorization Thesis, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 23, 23 (2006).
76
Kreitner, supra note 15, at 922; see Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty,
Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1728-29 (2008).
77
Kreitner, supra note 15, at 919-20.
78
Id.
79
Leib, supra note 19, at 22 (responding to Markovits, supra note 30).
80
Id.
73

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 [2013], Art. 10

670

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

son.81 Leib is also responding to the efficiency theory of Professors
Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott to the extent that it essentially limits
its application only to contracts between organizations.82 Leib argues
that theories that “box out” entire types of contracts fail to offer a
general theory of contract.83 Instead, these sub-categorizations could
be used as a way to prioritize competing principles. For example,
contracts between organizations would be governed by efficiency
over autonomy concerns. Contracts between individuals would be
governed by autonomy principles before efficiency concerns.84
Further, Kreitner gathers the work of scholars who have argued that distinct types of contracts should be governed by principles
that reflect the needs of that particular context, whether, for example,
landlord-tenant or employer-employee.85 This allows prioritizing of
competing principles with sensitivity to the context in which the contracting occurs.86
The recent scholarly attention to the sophistication of contracting parties fits neatly within this theoretical account of pluralism.
It also falls squarely within the observation that contract law has been
divided according to the status of the parties.87 This status-based dichotomy allows the law to prioritize competing principles and attempts to bring coherence to otherwise incommensurable values. For
sophisticated parties, autonomy and perhaps efficiency88 principles
govern. For those parties who are not sophisticated, normative con81

Id. at 21.
See id. at 3-4; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 546-47 (2003) (discussing the theory of literal interpretation of contracts between organizations). Indeed, Schwartz and Scott limit their “efficiency
theory” of contract to those deals where both parties are obviously sophisticated. Id. at 545.
They then draw a boundary line for these obviously sophisticated parties by stating that the
following firms fall into the first category: “(1) an entity that is organized in the corporate
form and that has five or more employees, (2) a limited partnership, or (3) a professional
partnership such as a law or accounting firm.” Id. They draw this categorical line on the
reasoning that “[t]hese economic entities can be expected to understand how to make business contracts.” Id.
83
Leib, supra note 19, at 22.
84
Kreitner, supra note 15, at 919-20.
85
Id.
86
Id.; see, e.g., Bix, supra note 14, at 199 (arguing that theories should be “localized to a
particular jurisdiction and/or to particular sub-categories of Contract Law”); see also Oman,
supra note 19, at 1484-85; Lipshaw, supra note 14, at 400.
87
Robert C. Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1972).
88
Jody Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420, 420 (2001).
82
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cerns about morality and fairness outweigh autonomy and efficiency.89
While the entity type formulation that Leib describes in the
collaborative and efficiency views has the allure of a bright-line, automatic categorization, it is an oversimplification that fails to account
for the nuance of any given circumstance or context.90 Fundamentally, the label of “sophisticated” recognizes (or, at least, should recognize) that imbalances of bargaining power must be factored into the
law’s application, and the concept of bargaining power is complex
and dynamic.91
Likewise, the scholars that look to transaction types to categorize the law of contract do so at the peril of deconstructing a general
body of contract law into numerous, specific areas of law. Instead,
categorization based on party sophistication makes a general body of
contract law possible.92 And the courts are already using this formulation.93 As I have argued elsewhere,94 sophistication needs to be
meaningfully defined and conceptualized, but its frame is available
and already a burgeoning and significant part of all aspects of contract doctrine from formation to remedies.
V.

CASE EXAMPLES

At this point it is worthwhile to provide some examples of
how the courts employ party sophistication and how the framework
of sophistication already exists as a tool to weigh competing contract
values. Increasingly, courts hold sophisticated parties to a different

89

Id.
See Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 296-97 (2005) (arguing that status-based dichotomies of “consumer versus non-consumer [and] merchant versus non-merchant . . . are false because small
businesses do not fall cleanly into any of these categories”).
91
See generally Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L.
REV. 139 (2005).
92
Nathan B. Oman, A Pragmatic Defense of Contract Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 77, 78 (2009).
93
See infra Part IV.
94
See generally Miller, supra note 1 (arguing that the courts should establish a definition
for “sophistication,” and develop a proper mode of analysis for deciding when application of
the term is proper). Indeed, in a 1972 article, Childres and Spitz observed: “[S]tatus analysis
clears the way to rational, just decision-making in all the categories. Once it is made explicit
that no single rule can be expected to operate across all status lines, we can get about the
business of trying to create new categories and rules.” Childres & Spitz, supra note 87, at
31.
90
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set of rules, grounded in freedom of contract.95 It is presumed ex post
that a sophisticated party was aware of what to bargain for96 and read
(or should have read) and understood (or should have understood) the
terms of a written agreement.97 Sophisticated parties are expected to
negotiate ably and order contract risks sensibly. Courts frequently
state that it is not their role to interfere with or “rewrite” the terms of
a deal for sophisticated parties.98
Two relatively recent decisions of the New York Court of
Appeals (the state’s highest court) serve as examples of sophisticated
parties being held to autonomy principles over all else. The first example involves the requirement of strict compliance with an express
condition precedent; the second example addresses the enforceability
of a release of future claims among members of a business entity.
The third example is an Ohio Supreme Court decision that deems a
buyer of real estate unsophisticated and, with that, allows the buyer to
rescind the contract based on mutual mistake.

95
One treatise notes that “equity often deals a harsher hand to the more sophisticated party.” Richard A. Lord, 28 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 70:153 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing
Farash v. Sykes Datatronics, Inc., 452 N.E.2d 1245, 1251 (N.Y. 1983)).
96
See Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 421
(N.Y. 1995) (requiring strict compliance with express condition precedent to formation of
sub-lease of commercial real estate). The court explained that “[i]f [sophisticated parties]
are dissatisfied with the consequences of their agreement, ‘the time to say so [was] at the
bargaining table.’ ” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo
Galbo, 502 N.E.2d 184, 189 (N.Y. 1986)).
97
Cara’s Notions, Inc. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 140 F.3d 566, 571 (4th Cir. 1998) (“The
Gibsons are sophisticated business people and Cara’s Notions, Inc., dealt with Hallmark at
arm’s length. Both parties to such a commercial contract have a duty to read the contract
carefully and are presumed to understand it.”); see also 7 Joseph M. Perillo, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS: AVOIDANCE AND REFORMATION § 28.38 (2002) (“The more sophisticated the
party, the greater the burden to read.”).
98
AccuSoft Corp. v. Palo, 237 F.3d 31, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[W]e do not consider it
our place to ‘rewrite contracts freely entered into between sophisticated business entities.’ ”
(quoting Mathewson Corp. v. Allied Marine Indus., Inc., 827 F.2d 850, 856 (1st Cir. 1987)));
LaSociete Generale Immobiliere v. Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency, 44 F.3d 629, 637 (8th
Cir. 1994) (“[W]here . . . two sophisticated parties negotiate[] a commercial contract which
was executed in the absence of fraud, duress, or any other form of unconscionability, we will
not rewrite the contract in order to save a contracting party from its own poor decisions.”);
Nelson v. Elway, 908 P.2d 102, 107 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (explaining when a contract is
between two sophisticated parties involved in a complex transaction, the court will not rewrite the contract to circumvent the clear intent of the parties); Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d at
421.
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Example 1: Strict Compliance with Express
Conditions

In Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon &
Co.,99 plaintiff (a national, full-service investment firm) had three
years remaining on a lease of the 33rd floor of One New York Plaza
in Manhattan.100 Defendant (an accounting firm) was already a tenant on the 29th floor of the same building.101 Plaintiff was looking to
vacate the premises and sublease the space on the 33rd floor; plaintiff
and defendant “entered into a letter agreement setting forth certain
conditions precedent to the formation and existence of a sublease between them.”102
Defendant wanted to construct “a telephone communication
linkage system between the 29th and 33rd floors.”103 Thus, one express condition precedent to formation of the sublease was that plaintiff provide defendant with the prime landlord’s consent in writing on
or before a date certain.104 On that date certain, plaintiff’s attorney
called defendant’s attorney to say that the prime landlord had consented to the work.105 When defendant later refused to go forward
with the sublease, plaintiff sued for breach of contract.106
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety,
claiming that the sublease was never formed because plaintiff failed
to comply with the express condition precedent that plaintiff provide
defendant with written notice of the prime landlord’s consent.107
Plaintiff argued that its attorney notified defendant orally and, therefore, substantially complied with the condition.108 The New York
Court of Appeals held for defendant on the ground that the express
condition precedent required written notice and, therefore, it had not
been satisfied.109
It is black letter law that an express condition requires strict
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

660 N.E.2d 415 (N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 416.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d at 416.
Id. at 417.
Id.
Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 419.
Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d at 421.
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compliance.110 The reasoning is that the court should not frustrate the
clearly expressed intention of the parties.111 In Oppenheimer, the oral
notice of the prime landlord’s consent did not satisfy the strict requirement of written notice.112 For sure, the result seems harsh and
overly technical. The parties’ attorneys had a discussion, and through
that discussion defendant was on actual notice of the prime landlord’s
consent to the work.113 Certainly, plaintiff had complied with the
spirit of the condition.
Notably absent from the decision is any discussion of the parties’ intent in requiring written notice. One can certainly imagine that
defendant wanted tangible evidence of the prime landlord’s consent
before taking on any obligations. On the other hand, another very
plausible view of the case is that defendant was not so concerned
about having the notice in writing but was able to use the written notice condition as a pretext, as a way to walk away from the sublease
based on a technicality. Recognizing the technical nature of the decision, the court wrote in its conclusion:
Freedom of contract prevails in an arm’s length transaction between sophisticated parties such as these, and
in the absence of countervailing public policy concerns there is no reason to relieve them of the consequences of their bargain. If they are dissatisfied with
the consequences of their agreement, “the time to say
so [was] at the bargaining table.”114
The fact that the parties in Oppenheimer were sophisticated
was not necessarily dispositive, but it served as a justification for
what might otherwise be seen as an overly formalistic decision. The
court certainly thought the parties’ sophistication was important
enough to mention in the conclusion of the decision.115
Oppenheimer presents a fundamental, underlying conflict that
pits freedom and individualism (yielding here to a rules-driven literalism) against greater societal norms and expectations (acknowledg-

110

Id. at 418.
Id.
112
Id. at 421.
113
Id. at 417.
114
Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d at 421 (alteration in original) (quoting Maxton Builders, 502
N.E.2d at 189 (N.Y)).
115
Id.
111
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ing plaintiff’s substantial compliance with the notice provision).116
The court resolved this tension by stating that, for sophisticated parties, “[f]reedom of contract prevails.”117 The implication is that had
plaintiff been unsophisticated, the autonomy principle may have been
outweighed by other values. This status-based method of ordering
the world of contracts allows the court to adhere to “freedom of contract” for these parties, but recognizes that another situation with a
different match of parties or a different type of contract might yield to
other, countervailing principles. Indeed, if, rather than a commercial
sublease between two large companies, we imagine this as a residential sublease between two individuals in a market with a glut of housing options, the prioritization of guiding values arguably shifts.
B.

Example 2: A General Release of Claims

In Oppenheimer, the New York Court of Appeals would not
rewrite the bargain for sophisticated parties.118 This is a familiar approach in cases involving a general release of claims, which the same
court had the opportunity to address in Arfa v. Zamir.119
In Arfa, plaintiffs and defendant (all individuals) formed a
business entity (“Company”) to purchase a building in Manhattan.120
Plaintiffs took ownership of 60% of the Company and defendant took
40%.121 Their “Governance Agreement” allocated management
rights equally between plaintiffs (50%) and defendant (50%).122 It
also included a general release of “any and all claims” whether
“known [or] unknown, which they have ever had, have or may now
have” arising from prior events.123
Defendant arranged the purchase of the building on behalf of
the Company.124 In arranging the deal and negotiating the Company’s “Governance Agreement,” plaintiffs alleged that defendant understated the cost of renovating the building and failed to disclose

116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id. at 418-19, 421.
Id. at 421.
Id.
905 N.Y.S.2d 77 (App. Div. 2010), aff’d, 952 N.E.2d 1003 (N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 77-78. The form of business entity is not specified in the court’s decision.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 78 n.1.
Id.
Arfa, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
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structural defects and building code violations.125 Plaintiffs sued for,
among other things, breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. 126 Defendant
argued that the release in the “Governance Agreement” barred plaintiffs’ claims.127
The appellate division (New York’s intermediate appellate
court) enforced the release and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, reasoning
that the governance agreement “was the result of rigorous, arm’slength negotiations between highly sophisticated parties.”128 The parties owed each other fiduciary obligations based on other, existing real estate businesses.129 Nevertheless, the appellate division went so
far as to hold that, “notwithstanding the fiduciary obligation owed by
each side to the other[,] . . . [plaintiffs], as sophisticated businesspeople, had ‘an affirmative duty . . . to protect themselves from misrepresentations . . . by investigating the details of the transactions and the
business’ affected by the Governance Agreement.”130
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a terse memorandum, reasoning:
[Plaintiffs] have failed to allege that they justifiably
relied on [defendant’s] fraudulent misstatements in
executing the release. By their own admission, plaintiffs, who are sophisticated parties, had ample indication prior to [signing the release] that defendant was
not trustworthy, yet they elected to release him from
the very claims they now bring without investigating

125

Id.
Id. at 77-79.
127
Id. at 78.
128
Id. at 78-79. I have criticized courts for generally failing to provide the reasons why
they label a party sophisticated. Coincidentally, in this case, the appellate division did a
good job of explaining this conclusion. Arfa, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 78 n.2. The court wrote:
In their complaint, Arfa/Shpigel allege the facts establishing their sophistication. Arfa, an attorney, has practiced law with the Securities and Exchange Commission and as a partner in a large corporate law firm for
more than 12 years. Shpigel, a 20-year veteran of the real estate business, is a principal in his own real estate brokerage firm and has served
as a consultant on investing in the U.S. real estate market to Israel’s
largest pension fund and to prominent Israeli individuals.
Id.
129
Id. at 78-79.
130
Id. (fourth and fifth alterations in original) (quoting Global Mins. & Metals Corp. v.
Holme, 824 N.Y.S.2d 210, 215 (App. Div. 2006)).
126
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the extent of his alleged misconduct.131
This is the prevailing view in cases addressing releases of prior or future claims, no-reliance clauses,132 and waivers of fiduciary duty.133
Indeed, in enforcing a general release of future claims, the Missouri
Supreme Court wrote that “[s]ophisticated parties have freedom of
contract—even to make a bad bargain, or to relinquish fundamental
rights.”134
Courts state the sophisticated parties can and should be able to
privately order their affairs, even if it leads to a “bad bargain.” 135 Sophisticated parties should read closely, investigate thoroughly, and
write their bargains carefully. The countervailing contract value for
sophisticated parties is autonomy and, with that, minimal judicial interference.
C.

Example 3: Mutual Mistake in a Residential Real
Estate Contract

The previous two examples involved contracts in a business
setting where the parties were deemed sophisticated. Oppenheimer
involved a contract between two organizations136 and Arfa involved a
“Governance Agreement” between individual members of the Company.137 In Reilley v. Richards,138 the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the rescission of a residential real estate contract between two
individuals.139 The court allowed an “unsophisticated” buyer to rescind the contract after closing on the ground of mutual mistake.140
In Reilley, buyer and seller entered into a contract for the purchase of real property.141 The buyer planned to build a family residence on the property.142 The buyer also happened to be an attor131

Arfa, 952 N.E.2d at 1004.
Miller, supra note 1, at 505-08.
133
See, e.g., Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 952
N.E.2d 995, 1001-02 (N.Y. 2011)).
134
Purcell Tire & Rubber Co. v. Exec. Beechcraft, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 505, 508 (Mo. 2001)
(en banc).
135
Id.
136
Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d at 687.
137
Arfa, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 77-78.
138
632 N.E.2d 507 (Ohio 1994).
139
Id. at 508.
140
Id. at 509.
141
Id.
142
Id.
132
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ney.143 Subsequent to closing, the parties discovered that part of the
property was in a flood hazard zone, which rendered the property untenable for the buyer’s building plans.144 Both buyer and seller were
unaware of the government’s flood hazard designation, and the buyer
sought rescission on the ground of mutual mistake.145 The Supreme
Court of Ohio allowed rescission of the contract, holding that the mutual mistake was “material to the subject matter of the contract.”146
In reaching this conclusion, the Reilley court observed that the
contract of sale contained an inspection provision, allowing the buyer
sixty days from signing the contract to conduct soil, engineering, utility, and any other inspections.147 The court held that this provision
did not mean that the buyer assumed the risk of the mistake.148 In
that connection, the court commented that the inspection would not
have revealed that the property was in a flood hazard zone.149 The
court also noted that the buyer “was a lawyer but . . . had no experience in real estate law and, thus, was an unsophisticated party at the
time of the transaction.”150 Among other things, the dissent challenged the majority’s determination that the buyer, an attorney (or
any attorney), is unsophisticated in real estate matters.151
The majority of the court did not adhere to “freedom of con-

143

Reilley, 632 N.E.2d at 509.
Id.
145
Id. at 508-09.
146
Id. at 509.
147
Id.
148
Reilley, 632 N.E.2d at 509.
149
Id.
150
Id. The majority of the court did not mention that the mistake was “one of law, not
fact”; although this point was raised by the dissent. Id. at 510 (Bryant, J., dissenting).
151
Id. at 510-11. The dissent wrote:
I am also troubled by the majority’s holding that appellant, a lawyer, has
no obligation to use all his knowledge if the matter at issue is not within
his area of practice. This holding does nothing to enhance the professional reputation of lawyers. The appellant in this case was not unsophisticated simply because he has no experience in real estate law. This
court has always considered licensed lawyers to be competent enough to
know those things which lawyers are required to know. An applicant’s
knowledge of the law of real property is tested on the Ohio bar examination; accordingly, attorneys are presumed to know the law applicable to
real estate. Ordinary citizens are not excused for their failure to know
the law applicable to such matters and attorneys certainly should not be
so excused.
Reilley, 632 N.E.2d at 510-11 (citations omitted).
144
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tract” and, instead, re-wrote the parties’ bargain to achieve fairness.152
Certainly, it could be argued that the result is not fair to the seller, but
setting that discussion aside, fairness norms are driving the outcome,
not autonomy or predictability and certainty. At least in part, this is
because the majority of the court believed the buyer was not knowledgeable of and experienced in real estate transactions.153
VI.

CONCLUSION

The attention of scholars and courts to party sophistication
embraces value pluralism; it recognizes that contract law serves several competing values and there is no “perfect whole.”154 But, even
given this recognition, it attempts to bring cohesion to a body of law
that applies to a diverse number of circumstances. As the cases
show, the courts are guided by different values in different contexts.155 They are inclined to hold an “unsophisticated” buyer of residential real estate to different guiding principles than a business owner with considerable experience.156
Once the status-based label of “sophisticated” or “unsophisticated” is applied, the law can prioritize competing values. For sophisticated parties, the supervalues are autonomy and individual liberty, which lead to a rules-driven and a-contextual approach that
lends itself to efficiency, predictability, and certainty. 157 For unsophisticated parties, the supervalue is a normative one of reasonableness and fairness; it is guided by a-contextual and standards-driven
approach.158
The label of “sophisticated” allows for a general body of contract law that is both principled and pragmatic, a difficult balance to
achieve. The challenge now, however, is to appropriate the existing,
basic structure of “party sophistication” and define and better conceptualize it for this purpose.
152

See id. at 509 (majority opinion).
Id.
154
Robinette, supra note 22, at 335 (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF
HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 13 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991)).
155
See Reilley, 632 N.E.2d 507; Oppenheimer, 660 N.E.2d 415; Arfa, 905 N.Y.S.2d 77.
156
Compare Reilley, 632 N.E.2d at 509 (allowing an unsophisticated buyer to rescind a
contract for residential real estate), with Arfa, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (preventing the sophisticated buyer to rescind contract).
157
Kraus, supra note 88.
158
Id.
153
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